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Insuring Against Another Enron: The Role of Cross-listing Status of Canadian Firms on 
the Purchase of Directors' and Officers' Insurance  
in the aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 In the wake of the wave of corporate scandals surrounding Enron, WorldCom, 
and many other prominent firms in 2001 and 2002, there has been much discussion of 
corporate governance. As a result of these widely publicized scandals, shareholders’ 
concern about agency problem that exists inherently in all corporations has increased. In 
response, the government enacted the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act, better known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (henceforth, SOX), in 2002. This 
monumental act seeks to prevent yet another crisis of corporate and accounting scandals 
by regulating publicly traded companies with strict measures for financial reporting, 
board composition, and disclosure (Harris 2003). With the passage of this legislation, 
there are now requirements for audit committee responsibilities and composition, 
certification of financial statements, timely disclosure, guidelines on penalties, as well as 
prohibitions against personal loans to directors (Harris 2003). These requirements serve 
the function of retaining investors’ confidence in the capital market. However, critics 
claim that SOX would not in reality prevent future scandals and rather would result in 
substantial costs (Cohen 2007). This is debatable; however, what is certain is that while 
corporate directors and officers have always faced the risk of lawsuits from shareholders, 
these risks now have been elevated with the introduction of SOX.  
 With increased risk comes a higher demand for insurance. As a result of the 
recent scandal and the new legislation, directors’ and officers’ insurance (henceforth, 
D&O insurance) grew in importance in corporate America (Cotter 2003). The main 
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function of D&O insurance is to cover the expenses, which may include both court costs 
and any settlements, in lawsuits against corporate directors and officers brought by 
shareholders or a third party. About 44 percent of the lawsuits against managers originate 
from shareholders, which brings up an interesting aspect of D&O insurance: this 
insurance protects directors against lawsuits brought by the shareholders who appointed 
them in the first place (Boyer 2007). D&O insurers set the premium by assessing firms’ 
litigation risk, which is found by multiplying the probability of a lawsuit by the expected 
cost of the suit. Yet, it is designed to benefit both parties involved: management is 
protected from possible liabilities while shareholders insure themselves against potential 
losses due to neglect in management. This design leads some researchers to suggest that 
D&O insurance may serve as a substitute for supervision of the board by shareholders 
(Boyer 2007). Rather than monitoring directors and managers against negligence, D&O 
insurance protects the portion of the firm that shareholders own. In 1998, about 92 
percent of U.S. firms and 84 percent of Canadian firms purchased D&O insurance for 
their directors and officers. Although many firms had already purchased D&O insurance 
prior to the passage of SOX, the increased threat of lawsuits from this legislation may 
have had an impact on the amount of insurance purchased as well as the decision to 
purchase for the firms that did not previously purchase the insurance. 
 My goal is to determine the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on whether or 
not a firm decides to purchase D&O insurance and the policy limit of this insurance. I 
examine Canadian firms in part because there are fewer Canadian firms insured against 
directors’ and officers’ liability, as opposed to in the U.S. nearly all publicly traded firms 
purchase D&O insurance even before SOX. Thus, it would be difficult to study the trend 
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of D&O insurance purchase simply by examining only the American firms. Also, it is 
useful to compare Canadian firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. and those that are not 
because this comparison would allow for me to observe the impact of SOX. Yet another 
advantage of using Canadian firms is that companies listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange are required to disclose information about D&O insurance while most other 
stock exchanges do not. Currently there is little research on firms’ purchase decision of 
insurance as a result of SOX. Most research examines firm characteristics that lead to an 
increase or a decrease in the likelihood that a firm will purchase D&O insurance. As 
numerous studies reveal, characteristics such as industry effects, size of the firm, and the 
characteristics of their board of directors, play an important role in insurance purchase 
decisions. Therefore, it is critical to control for these effects. 
II. Existing Literature 
Because it has not been long since SOX was enacted, very few literatures link it to 
firm behavior regarding D&O insurance. However, much research relates firm 
characteristics to D&O insurance purchase decisions. Martin M. Boyer of Université de 
Montréal (2005) tests the “shareholder protection hypothesis,” which states that D&O 
insurance is valued the most by shareholders and protects them more than it protects 
managers. He finds that shareholder wealth and reliance on debt as the source of capital 
are positively related to the purchase of D&O insurance. He concludes that shareholders 
use D&O insurance in order to protect their own wealth in case of managerial 
incompetence. Therefore, increased shareholder risk raises insurance protection for 
managers. On the other hand, he also finds that managerial risk aversion and firms’ 
financial distress do not significantly affect insurance decisions.  
  4 
Boyer’s later study (2007) contradicts some of these earlier findings. In this study, 
the only characteristics that he found to have a positive effect on D&O insurance 
purchase were corporations’ size and firm’s experience of financial distress. His sample 
consists of Canadian firms in eight different industries, 10 percent of which were listed in 
a stock exchange in the United States. Using this sample, Boyer also learned that being 
listed on a U.S. stock exchange did not have a significant impact on firms’ decision to 
purchase D&O insurance, while stock price volatility, return on assets, the proportion of 
outsiders on the board, and stock ownership by financial institutions, all had a negative 
effect. 
Martin Boyer and Sharon Tennyson’s recent study (2008) goes even further by 
not only studying firms’ D&O insurance purchase decisions, but also their choice of 
policy limit. Thus, they take into consideration the amount of insurance firms decide to 
purchase rather than simply whether or not insurance was purchased. They test separate 
factors related to these two distinct outcomes and find that firms compensating board 
members through options are less likely to purchase insurance while those with a larger 
percentage of outsiders on the board are more likely to purchase. In terms of insurance 
policy limit, larger firms are more likely to purchase a higher policy limit while a high 
unit price of insurance decreases the policy limit. 
John E. Core (1997) conducts a similar study of the characteristics that affect the 
demand for D&O insurance. Core examines three issues: demand for personal coverage 
as a part of an efficient outside-director contract, demand for corporate coverage as a 
result of an efficient corporate insurance purchase decision, and demand for insurance as 
a result of managerial entrenchment. He concludes that some outside directors may not 
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fully understand the risk that they face because: (i) it is difficult to predict for the firms 
without D&O insurance; (ii) there is no substitution between D&O insurance and cash 
compensation for managers; and (iii) prior litigation predicts the insurance limit but not 
the deductible. A more recent study by Core (2007) varies slightly from Boyer’s studies 
in that it rather measures the insurance premium. This study demonstrates that D&O 
premiums tend to be higher with a greater insider share of votes, lower inside ownership, 
more insider directors, more outside directors appointed by the CEO, and more inside 
officers with employment contracts. From these results, Core concludes that D&O 
premiums do in fact reflect the quality of corporate governance, since a high premium, 
which implies weak governance, is positively related to excess compensation.  
Noel O’Sullivan (1997), on the other hand, uses a sample of 366 firms in the 
United Kingdom to conduct a virtually identical study. His results show that firms 
purchasing D&O insurance tend to have a greater portion of outside directors on the 
board and smaller executive ownership of the firm, while external shareholder control has 
no significant effect on insurance purchase decisions. O’Sullivan notes that these finding 
are relevant for American companies as well, since existing literature confirms the 
similarity between the two countries in shareholder and manager activities and 
motivation. 
Some studies examine aspects of D&O insurance other than the characteristics 
that influence the demand and decisions regarding its purchase. A paper by Clifford G. 
Holderness (1990) asks whether liability insurance functions as a corporate monitor. His 
meta-analysis reveals that it is usually publicly traded corporations that buy these 
policies, group policies are more prevalent than individual policies, policies usually cover 
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only directors and officers and not any other employees, and initial announcement of 
purchase of insurance causes an increase in stock prices. From these results, Holderness 
concludes that liability insurance companies do serve as external monitors of the board 
through their litigation efforts and also by encouraging internal monitoring by facilitating 
the recruitment of outside directors. He explains that when a firm purchases D&O 
insurance, its directors and officers are essentially agreeing that a potential lawsuit would 
be investigated by a third party, which is the insurance company. He also finds that 
outside directors function as internal monitors because they are more effective in 
monitoring executives and other managers for the shareholders than are internal directors 
who also serve in the management of the company.  
However, competing results are presented in a more recent paper by Tom Baker 
and Sean Griffith (2007), who interview individuals in the D&O insurance industry about 
the relationship between insurance companies and their public company insureds. They 
focus on whether insurers offer loss preventions services to their insureds and whether 
insurers monitor the insureds’ corporate governance. Those interviewed include 
underwriters, actuaries, claim managers, brokers, lawyers, and corporate risk managers. 
The authors find that D&O insurance companies do not monitor corporations or provide 
loss preventions services, insurance pricing provides only a diffuse loss prevention 
incentive, and insurers manage settlements but not defense costs in case of litigation. 
These opposing findings may be attributed to the different methods used in the two 
studies.  
John Chalmers, Larry Dann, and Jarrad Harford (2002) use the relationship 
between D&O insurance and performance to determine the existence of managerial 
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opportunism through the use of adverse information. Specifically, they ask whether the 
amount of D&O insurance coverage at the time of the firm’s initial public offering (IPO) 
affects stock price performance after the IPO. They then ask whether abnormally high 
insurance premiums of firms with poor post-IPO performance signifies that managers 
have used adverse information in making insurance decisions and whether the insurers 
can distinguish the difference in purchase decisions driven by such adverse information. 
The results show that while a lower premium is not related to better corporate governance 
for high-performing companies, they did find a negative relationship between the amount 
of insurance at IPO and stock price performance in the next three years for other lower-
performing firms. From these findings, the authors conclude that managers do in fact 
utilize such adverse information for personal advantage.  
Although SOX is relatively new, there have been a number of studies on its 
impact in corporate governance literature. Daniel Cohen, Aiyesha Dey, and Thomas Lys 
(2004) examine the effects of SOX on compensation contracts and risk-taking behavior 
by managers. They run two-stage least squares regressions, one determining the impact 
on CEO compensation and the other on total risky investments. They find that after the 
enactment of SOX, there was an increase in salary and bonus compensation but a 
decrease in both option-based compensation and in the proportion of incentive-based 
salary to fixed salary. There also was a significant decline in risky investments made by 
the CEO, and the change in equity incentives and risky investments are negatively 
associated with future stock return volatility. James Linck, Jeffry Netter, and Tina Yang 
(2008) study the impact of SOX on corporate boards more generally. After running a 
multivariate analysis, the authors find that SOX indeed has had a significant impact on 
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the cost and the structure of corporate boards. The average number of directorship held 
by one individual decreased, director compensation and D&O insurance premiums 
increased, and the boards have become larger with more independence. Also, posts of 
CEO and the chairman of the board (COB) are more likely to be separated, director 
turnover increased, and firms are more likely to add non-employee directors on board. 
This study is interesting because it directly addresses the effect of SOX on D&O 
insurance, although not from the perspective of the purchasing firm. Insurance premiums 
rose as a result of the new legislation, which is logical since the costs of managers’ 
negligence and corporate fraud have increased as a result of SOX. 
Kate Litvak (2007) conducts her research by comparing foreign companies cross-
listed on a U.S. stock exchange with those that are not, which is quite relevant to this 
paper. She examines the stock price reactions to SOX in three groups of foreign 
companies: a control group consisting of cross-listed firms that are not subject to SOX 
but are indirectly affected by the general tightening of American regulations, a second 
control group of firms that are not cross-listed, and the treatment group of cross-listed 
firms that are subject to SOX. Using both the event study method and a multivariate 
regression approach, Litvak finds that stock prices of cross-listed companies subject to 
SOX responded strongly and negatively to American regulations as opposed to similar 
non-cross-listed firms. The cross-listed firms not subject to SOX responded negatively 
also, but not as strongly as those subject to the act. In addition, well-governed countries, 
such as the European countries and Canada, responded more strongly to SOX, and that 
there are three firm-level predictors. These predictors are (i) the level of disclosure, 
which was negatively related to stock prices; (ii) sales growth over 1999-2001 prior to the 
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enactment, which was positively related; and (iii) belonging to an already heavily 
regulated financial industry, which had negative effects.  
Robert McDonnell’s study (2004) looks specifically at the effect SOX has had on 
the conduct of directors and officers. He finds that SOX affects the monitoring and the 
self-control mechanisms in firms, which are two mechanisms that control agency 
problem. McDonnell argues that SOX has not greatly changed managers’ conduct, but 
directors and officers are nevertheless performing their fiduciary duty more diligently 
because of a greater fear of liability. Robert Clark (2005), on the other hand, studies 
broader effects of recent changes in corporate governance. He identifies four essential 
phases in these recent changes: the passage of SOX, the new listing requirements of New 
York Stock Exchange, growth in the influence of corporate governance rating systems, 
and an apparent change in tone and focus of judicial opinions. Clark questions whether 
these reforms truly brought about improvements in corporate governance. He claims that 
the benefits of changes in audit services are offset by the higher cost of such services and 
the need to separate auditing services from non-auditing services. Also, the changes 
related to the board may overemphasize the monitoring role of the board over its 
management role, and the changes related to disclosure only encompass the types of 
fraud from the recent scandals and new type of fraud may possibly emerge in the future.  
William Carney’s (2005) study also questions the benefits of SOX, but he 
specifically looks at the firms’ decision to terminate reporting under securities laws, or in 
other words, “going private” or “going dark.” Through this qualitative study closely 
analyzes securities laws, historical changes, and other related literature, Carney first 
discusses the major costs associated with the activities in compliance with SOX. Such 
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costs include the use of external firms to evaluate internal control and an increase in the 
responsibilities of audit committees. Empirical evidence of such costs include increases 
in litigation and audit costs, and the impact of these costs on firms after the passage of 
SOX. He explains that there are advantages of firms going private because of these costs. 
The benefits of going private would induce many firms to terminate their reporting under 
the securities laws. 
III. Sample and Hypotheses Development 
A.   Description of Data 
The primary dataset used in this study was hand-collected and constructed by a 
researcher from Université de Montréal using publicly available data on Canadian 
companies on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE). These companies are all traded on 
TSE but are not limited to trading just on this stock exchange. The dataset not only 
includes information on D&O insurance purchases, premium, and deductibles, but also 
contains a wide range of financial and governance characteristics of the companies. Each 
firm’s annual management proxy and information circular provides information 
concerning D&O insurance as well as board composition and compensation. Financial 
data comes from Compustat, and information on stock prices and total returns is provided 
by the data retrieval services of TSE. The sample of firms utilized in this study consists 
of 153 Canadian firms in seven different industries: biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, 
paper products, industrial products, high tech, consumer products, merchandising, and 
media. The number of firms in each industry varies, with industrial products firms being 
the largest group with 45 firms while biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms and media 
firms being the two smallest industries with 12 firms.  
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Because SOX was enacted in 2002, the years before and the years after must be 
examined in order to determine the effects of this legislation. Overall, data on these firms 
run from 1996 through 2005, but the years of available data vary for each firm. This is 
because some companies were not incorporated until years after 1996, others merged or 
were acquired by another firm during this time period, and some have declared 
bankruptcy and sold all of their assets. Thus, only the companies with data before and 
after the enactment of SOX are utilized in the analysis, and only the data from years 2000 
through 2005 are examined. These firms are then separated into those that are listed only 
in Canadian stock exchanges and those that are listed in both Canadian and at least one of 
the U.S. stock exchanges. Information about firms’ cross-listing status was obtained 
through the companies’ annual reports found in the database Mergent Online.  
The original dataset contains 342 firms over the same seven industries. However, 
many firms were dropped for one or more of the following reasons: (i) if the firms did not 
have data during the years examined; (ii) if the last year for which the data is available is 
2002 or earlier; and (iii) if the information on cross-listing status was not available for the 
years studied. 
Figures 1 through 3 describe the sample in terms of percentages of total 
observations. Figure 1 shows the trend of D&O insurance purchases between years 2000 
and 2005 for both firms that are cross-listed and firms that are not. In year 2002, there is a 
slight increase in the proportion of firms that purchase D&O insurance and a slight 
decrease for firms that do not purchase the insurance. However, after 2002, the 
percentage slightly decreases again for those that buy insurance and slightly increases for 
those that do not, although not quite back to the pre-2002 levels.  Figure 2 separates the 
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D&O insurance purchase decision according to each of the seven industries. The industry 
in which the largest portion of firms purchases D&O insurance is the biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals industry, while a smaller proportion of firms in the paper industry 
purchase insurance. Then figure 3 illustrates the cross-listing status of firms in the sample 
by each industry. This figure is of interest because it shows that industry effects are 
potentially significant in the firms’ decisions to list in the U.S. as well as in Canada. Of 
the seven industries, the merchandizing industry especially attracts attention, since all of 
the firms in this industry are not cross-listed during the years studied. On the other hand, 
the biotechnology and pharmaceuticals industry has the greatest proportion of its firms 
cross-listed, almost reaching 50 percent. Looking at the biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals industry in figures 2 and 3, it is interesting to note the link between the 
firms’ cross-listing status and the insurance purchase decision. As the industry in which 
the largest proportion of firms purchase D&O insurance, biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals also is the industry in which a large portion of firms list their stocks in 
both the U.S. and Canada.  
B.   Hypothesis  
First, I investigate and compare the general impact of the United States securities 
laws on firms cross-listed in the U.S. and Canada stock exchanges with those that are 
only listed in Canada. Even without considering the specific effects of SOX, being listed 
in the more regulated American market should have a greater impact on the cross-listed 
firms than on non-cross-listed firms. Both D&O insurance purchase decision as well as 
insurance policy limit are examined. I control for various firm characteristics, which 
include industry, year, firm size as measured by assets, number of shares owned by 
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insiders, and percentage of shares owned by financial institutions. I discuss specific firm 
characteristics in more detail in a later section. 
Subsequently, the more specific impact of SOX will be examined, again 
comparing cross-listed firms with non-cross-listed firms. In this case, however, I compare 
the decisions regarding D&O insurance in these two types of firms before and after the 
enactment of SOX. Thus, I compare D&O insurance purchase decisions and insurance 
policy limit before and after SOX for companies only listed in Canada as well as for 
companies listed in both countries. The ratification of SOX in the United States should 
have an even greater impact on cross-listed firms’ insurance decisions than the non-cross-
listed firms’ decisions. Cross-listed firms face restrictions not only from the stricter U.S. 
security laws, but with SOX they now face a higher penalty in case of managerial 
shirking. Thus, I hypothesize that firms listed in both the U.S. and Canada will be more 
likely to purchase D&O insurance and to choose a higher policy limit when compared to 
firms that are only listed in Canada, especially after the passage of SOX in 2002. 
IV. Research Design 
Table 1 shows the D&O insurance purchase decision of the firms in the sample by 
their cross-listing status. This table indicates that a greater percentage of cross-listed 
firms, at 86.11 percent, purchase D&O insurance while about 74.82 percent of non-cross-
listed firms purchase the insurance.  
I use a probit regression model to determine the effect of being listed in the U.S. 
on the decision to purchase D&O insurance. A probit model was used here because the 
dependent variable (insurance purchase decision) is a binary variable. I control for 
various firm characteristics that could potentially affect the purchase decision. This 
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allows me to control for other effects that may influence companies’ decisions. I run two 
separate models in order to see the impact of cross-listing status on D&O purchase 
decisions: one with and one without considering the effects of SOX. The model without 
taking SOX into account is: 
Purchase = α + β1 crosslist + βn X + βn+1 industry + βn+2 year + ε 
where purchase is a binary variable for the purchase decision equal to one if D&O is 
purchased, and zero otherwise. The variable crosslist is also a binary variable equal to 1 if 
listed in both Canada and in the U.S., and 0 otherwise. The variable X is a vector of all of 
the individual firm characteristics that are controlled in the regression. Characteristics 
included in X are: firm size in terms of assets (ln_assets); shareholding of insiders 
(inside_own); percentage of shares owned by financial institutions (fin_blockholder); 
volatility measured by the standard deviation of compounded daily returns (vol2); the 
standard deviation of return on assets over the previous three years (roa_sd3); lagged 
return on assets (lag_roa); percent of compensation in options (pct_options); a binary 
variable for growth in assets that equals one if assets increased more than 25 percent 
within a year (bigass_grow); the likelihood of financial distress (distress); number of 
board members (n_board); percent of outsiders on board (pct_outside); whether the CEO 
is also the Chairman of the Board (ceocob); and the percent of shares traded in the 
previous year (lag_pcttrade). This model not only controls for the firm characteristics, but 
also controls for industry effects and the variations found in different years in the data. 
Summary statistics of all of the descriptive variables can be found in Table 2. Similarly, 
the second regression that includes the effect of SOX is: 
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Purchase = α + β1 crosslist + β2 crosslist*post2002 + βn X+ βn+1 industry  
+ βn+2 year + ε 
where the interaction term crosslist*post2002 is a term that is created by multiplying 
crosslist with a new variable, post2002, which represents all observations after year 2002 
when SOX was passed. This interaction shows the impact of the enactment of SOX on 
D&O insurance purchase decisions based on the cross-listing status of the firms. 
Therefore, the coefficient β2 demonstrates this impact.  
The second set of regressions involves D&O insurance policy limits rather than 
the insurance purchase decision. In this case, the dependent variable is continuous, so 
ordinary least square regression is used, controlling for the same firm characteristics. The 
model of the effect of cross-listing status on policy limit without taking into account the 
impact of SOX is: 
Limit = α + β1 crosslist + βn X + βn+1 industry + βn+2 year + ε 
where limit is the natural log of aggregate policy limit purchased by the firm. Similar to 
the probit models used for insurance purchase decisions, I again used the same interaction 
term in order to observe the way SOX affects D&O policy limit. The model for this effect 
is the following: 
Limit = α + β1 crosslist + β2 crosslist*post2002 + βn X + βn+1 industry  
+ βn+2 year + ε 
In this model, just as in the probit model for D&O insurance purchase decisions, the 
coefficient of interest is β2, which represents the effect of being cross-listed and of SOX 
on the amount of insurance a firm purchases. 
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V. Empirical results and Discussion 
A. Analysis of D&O Insurance Purchase Decision 
As seen in Table 4, the results from the probit model show that the general 
regulatory environment in the U.S. does not have a significant effect on a firm’s decision 
to purchase D&O insurance. The coefficient of crosslist is not only small and negative, 
but also is not statistically significant at either the 5 percent or the 10 percent level. Most 
of the descriptive variables are also not significant, but the percent of outsiders on the 
board (pct_outside) is significant at the 5 percent level. This variable is positively 
associated with the insurance purchase decision, which means that with a greater 
proportion of outsiders on the board, it is more likely for the firm to purchase D&O 
insurance.  
Also, years 2002 and 2004 are both significant at the 5 percent level while 2005 is 
marginally significant (at the 10 percent level). Although individually, only these three 
years are significant, all years after SOX (2002-2005) are jointly significant with a chi-
square value of about 0.03 for both when effects of SOX are and are not taken into 
account. These results suggest that even though cross-listing status does not show a 
significant effect of SOX on firms’ insurance purchase decisions, there still is an overall 
effect of the post-SOX years for both types of firms. There are several possible 
interpretations of this upward shift in D&O insurance purchase after 2002. This may be 
due to SOX or the general changes in corporate environment following the scandals. It is 
important to recognize that in year 2004, D&O insurance prices decreased by about 10 
percent, which means that insurance became more attractive for firms to purchase (Taub 
2004). Moreover, after the United States passed SOX, Canada also implemented several 
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measures in order to regulate and strengthen corporate governance, many of which were 
passed in year 2004 (Ben-Ishai 479). Some of these measures include regulations on the 
oversight of auditors and audit committee, CEO and CFO certifications, and other 
corporate governance guidelines (Ben-Ishai 479). Although it is difficult to separate these 
various possible reasons for the joint significance of the post-SOX years, all of these 
possibilities may have contributed to the positive relationship between the years after 
2002 and D&O insurance purchase decisions and may explain why cross-listing status 
itself is not statistically significant. 
When the interaction variable crosslist*post2002 is included in the model in order 
to determine the effect of SOX on insurance purchases in the two types of firms, the 
results are similar, as shown in Table 5. Neither crosslist nor crosslist*post2002 are 
significantly associated with the insurance purchase decision, while the percent of 
outsiders on the board and the years 2002 and 2004, are significant in the 5 percent 
significance level. In addition, for both of the probit models described previously, the 
industry variable is highly significant. This significant industry variable suggest the 
possibility that certain industries have qualities that make D&O insurance more valuable 
than in other industries. 
B. Analysis of Aggregate Insurance Policy Limit 
 Estimates of the impact on insurance policy limits are displayed in Tables 6 and 7. 
As in the case for D&O insurance purchase decision, these regression models also show 
that there is no significant effect of cross-listing status on the amount of insurance 
purchased. The coefficient of the cross-listing status variable when the effects of SOX are 
not taken into account is positive but not statistically significant. However, some of the 
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other descriptive variables are significantly related to the amount of insurance purchased. 
Firm size in terms of assets (ln_assets) is positive and highly significant, which means 
that larger firms tend to buy more insurance. Shareholding by insiders, represented by the 
variable inside_own, is negative and significant at the 5 percent level. This is reasonable 
because when many insiders own shares in the firm, agency costs are reduced since 
managers now have financial stakes in the firm. Thus, D&O insurance is less likely to be 
essential for the firm. Also, the standard of deviation of return on assets over 3 years 
(roa_sd3) is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. This variable is a measure of 
earnings uncertainty, so a firm would be more likely to purchase insurance for their 
directors and officers if the firm’s earnings and performance are perceived less secure. In 
addition, growth in assets of over 25 percent per year (bigass_grow) is negative and 
significant at the 5 percent level. Because this variable is indicative of unusual activities 
such as a merger or an acquisition, the negative coefficient also seems reasonable. Major 
changes such as mergers or acquisitions often tend to increase shareholder value and 
improve the outlook for firms under stress, so D&O insurance may not be as necessary 
when such changes take place. Furthermore, the year variable shows results similar to 
that of D&O insurance purchase decisions. Although 2002 is not statistically significant 
in this case, both the years 2004 and 2005 are positive and significant at the 5 percent 
level. Again, an unknown factor, such as the decrease in insurance prices or the laws 
enacted to raise director accountability in 2004, may have had some impact on firms’ 
decisions to purchase more insurance for their directors and officers. However, unlike the 
insurance purchase decision, here there is no industry effect, since none of the industries 
are even marginally significant. Thus, I speculate that even though firms in certain 
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industries are more likely to buy D&O insurance than others, once the firm buys 
insurance, the firm’s particular industry does not affect how much insurance it decides to 
purchase. This means that after purchasing insurance, the amount of insurance becomes a 
firm-specific decision.  
 When the effects of SOX are taken into account by adding the interaction 
variable, the results remain essentially equal. While both the cross-listing status variable 
and the interaction between cross-listing and the years after SOX are not statistically 
significant, all of the variables that had an impact on the amount of insurance purchased 
when effects of SOX were not considered retain their significance, as Table 7 indicates. 
One small difference is that year 2005 is now significant only at the 10 percent level. 
Therefore, as with the D&O insurance purchase decision, regression results indicate that 
neither the cross-listing status nor the enactment of SOX had an impact on the firms’ 
decisions to increase insurance policy limits. 
There are several possible explanations why cross-listing status and SOX are not 
significantly associated with D&O insurance decisions. One such explanation is that the 
act of cross-listing in the two countries may change governance forms of these firms. 
However, this is difficult to determine from this study, for almost none of the firms in the 
sample change their cross-listing status during the years studied. A second possible 
reason is that certain firm characteristics may lead to the propensity to cross-list in stock 
exchanges of both countries. If either of these explanations is true, it is reasonable to 
conjecture that cross-listing status was not significant in the models because the 
characteristics that are related to cross-listing status were all controlled in these models. 
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In order to test these possibilities, I conducted t-tests of all of the descriptive 
variables between the cross-listed and the non-cross-listed firms. The purpose of these t-
tests was to observe the differences in means across these two types of firms without 
taking various firm characteristics into account. The results, as shown in Table 3, 
demonstrate that the two groups of firms are significantly different in most of these firm 
characteristics, with the exception of the standard deviation of return on assets over the 
previous three years, lagged return on assets, percent of compensation in options, growth 
in assets of more than 25 percent per year, and the likelihood of financial distress in the 
firm. These t-tests suggest a potential reason why cross-listing status was not statistically 
significant for all of the models: cross-listed firms and non-cross-listed firms may be 
fundamentally different in some of the firm characteristics that were controlled in the 
regression models.  
VI. Conclusion 
 The hasty enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 after the wave of large-scale 
corporate scandals has certainly had a large effect on the corporate environment in the 
United States, although it is debatable whether this effect has been positive or negative. 
The logic behind this study was that after Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in 2002, 
Canadian firms that list their shares in one of the stock exchanges in the U.S. as well as 
their own Toronto Stock Exchange would be more affected by this legislation when 
compared to the firms only listed in Canada. Specifically, I examined the effect of this 
legislation on the firms’ decisions regarding directors’ and officers’ insurance. Although I 
had hypothesized that the firms listed both in Canada and the U.S. would both be more 
likely to purchase D&O insurance and to choose a higher policy limit if they had already 
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provided the insurance, the empirical results indicate that such relationships do not exist. 
However, various firm characteristics and some of the specific industries may either 
promote or discourage the provision of D&O insurance for the firms’ directors and 
officers. It is also interesting to note that although the cross-listing status of firms or the 
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act do not directly affect D&O insurance decisions, the 
general environment of corporate law may have had an influence, as shown by the 
significant year effects in years 2004 and 2005 for decisions regarding aggregate policy 
limit. On the other hand, years 2002 through 2005 are all significant for insurance 
purchase decision. This may mean that SOX and the changes in corporate regulation 
environment may have had some effect on purchase decisions, but not policy limits, for 
both cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms. It is worth investigating in the future how 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has had an impact on Canadian corporate laws and the general 
public sentiment about corporate governance in Canada.  
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Table 1: D&O Insurance Purchase Decision by Cross-list Status 
 
Cross-list Status D&O Insurance Purchase Total 
 Do not purchase Purchase  
Not Cross-listed 172 511 683 
 25.18 74.82 100.00 
    
Cross-listed 25 155 180 
 13.89 86.11 100.00 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of descriptive variables 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Firm 868 4156.5 1999.888 1001 8031 
Year 868 2002.377 1.672013 2000 2005 
CEO is also COB 844 0.3151659 0.4648574 0 1 
Volatility (std. dev. of 
compounded daily returns) 731 2.908865 3.535359 0.0070711 25.22415 
Lagged return on assets 727 -0.02292 0.3089368 -6.412963 0.6082234 
Percent of shares traded 
previous year 718 0.41382 0.3776626 0.0065309 3.158811 
Likelihood of financial distress 683 -8.355093 18.09863 -242.1688 50.35197 
Industry 868 4.124424 2.00477 1 8 
D&O purchase 863 0.7717265 0.4199632 0 1 
Shareholding by insiders 868 24.25765 30.41147 0 100 
Number of board members 855 8.928655 2.822345 3 17 
Percent of outsiders on board 855 0.622035 0.1603878 0.1 1 
Growth in assets (if increased 
more than 25% in a year) 720 0.1819444 0.3860669 0 1 
Firm size in assets 722 6.043141 1.97146 -0.6161861 11.05593 
Aggregate policy limit  642 1.69E+01 1.08E+00 13.87739 2.00E+01 
Percent of compensation in 
options 868 0.175313 1.343734 0 17.47793 
Percent of shares owned by 
financial institutions 868 0.3548387 0.4787403 0 1 
Standard deviation of return on 
assets over previous 3 years 723 0.0873791 0.2656867 0.0007621 3.640651 
Cross-list status 868 0.2073733 0.4056589 0 1 
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Table 3: T-test of differences in means across cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms 
Variable Mean: Not Cross-listed Mean: Cross-listed t-statistic 
Purchase decision 0.7481698 0.8611111 -3.2273 
Aggregate policy limit 16.7057 17.36219 -6.8085 
Firm size in assets 5.697827 7.256059 -9.3325 
Shareholding of 
insiders 
26.70057 14.92028 4.6824 
Percent of shares 
owned by financial 
institutions 
0.3822674 0.25 3.3191 
Volatility (std. dev. of 
compounded daily 
returns) 
2.450873 4.543323 -6.8198 
Standard deviation of 
return on assets over 
previous 3 years 
0.0901478 0.0776368 0.5254 
Lagged return on assets 
-0.0166791 -0.0450356 1.0254 
Percent of 
compensation in 
options 
0.1501471 0.2715029 -1.0788 
Growth in assets (if 
increased more than 
25% in a year) 
0.1696429 0.225 -1.6013 
Likelihood of financial 
distress 
-8.736162 -7.067762 -1.0114 
Number of board 
members 
8.712593 9.738889 -4.3807 
Percent of outsiders on 
board 
0.6137371 0.6531519 -2.9426 
CEO is also COB 0.3403614 0.2222222 3.039 
Percent of shares traded 
previous year 
0.3348896 0.6890895 11.3527 
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Table 4: Estimates of D&O insurance purchase decision based on cross-listing status 
    Robust     
   dF/dx Std. Err. z P>z 
     
Cross-list status -0.0442695 0.0751383 -0.64 0.519 
Firm size in assets 0.031821 0.0176862 1.78 0.075 
Shareholding by insiders 0.000136 0.0007096 0.19 0.848 
Percent of shares owned 
by financial institutions -0.0180876 0.0404324 -0.46 0.647 
Volatility (std. dev. of 
compounded daily 
returns) -0.0015932 0.0041076 -0.38 0.702 
Std. dev. Of return on 
assets in previous 3 years 0.0689626 0.0781541 0.88 0.377 
Lagged return on assets 0.1268805 0.0777779 1.73 0.083 
Percent of compensation 
in options -0.0109597 0.010374 -1.1 0.272 
Growth in assets (if 
increased more than 25% 
in a year) 0.0124716 0.0251965 0.48 0.631 
Likelihood of financial 
distress 0.0003333 0.0006257 0.54 0.592 
Number of board 
members 0.0046377 0.0098945 0.47 0.641 
Percent of outsiders on 
board 0.2976909 0.0974005 2.96 0.003 
CEO is also COB 0.0206926 0.0431613 0.46 0.647 
Percent of shares traded 
previous year -0.0336691 0.0441278 -0.76 0.444 
Year 2001 0.0146734 0.0126484 1.09 0.275 
Year 2002 0.0432367 0.0153401 2.57 0.01 
Year 2003 0.0327745 0.0190525 1.57 0.116 
Year 2004 0.0551334 0.0193596 2.59 0.01 
Year 2005 0.0461221 0.0218256 1.96 0.05 
Industry 2 -0.9835875 0.0068643 -9.88 0 
Industry 3 -0.9994051 0.0007412 -10.63 0 
Industry 4 -0.9875035 0.0055832 -10.55 0 
Industry 5 -0.9963774 0.0022889 -10.13 0 
Industry 6 -0.9760402 0.0089809 -9.61 0 
Industry 7 -0.9715864 0.0101351 -8.65 0 
  28 
Table 5: Estimates of D&O insurance purchase decision based on cross-listing status 
controlling for interaction between cross-listing status and years after SOX 
    Robust     
  dF/dx Std. Err. z P>z 
     
Cross-list status -0.0256334 0.0787593 -0.34 0.73 
Interaction of cross-list 
status and post-SOX years -0.0352685 0.0566562 -0.67 0.504 
Firm size in assets 0.0311982 0.0176045 1.75 0.079 
Shareholding by insiders 0.0001462 0.000704 0.21 0.835 
Percent of shares owned by 
financial institutions -0.0177698 0.040033 -0.46 0.649 
Volatility (std. dev. of 
compounded daily returns) -0.0016421 0.0040898 -0.4 0.692 
Std. dev. Of return on assets 
in previous 3 years 0.0701791 0.0769813 0.91 0.361 
Lagged return on assets 0.128423 0.0774886 1.76 0.078 
Percent of compensation in 
options -0.0108893 0.0103623 -1.09 0.275 
Growth in assets (if 
increased more than 25% in 
a year) 0.0114073 0.0254366 0.44 0.663 
Likelihood of financial 
distress 0.0003367 0.0006197 0.55 0.584 
Number of board members 0.0047192 0.0098414 0.48 0.633 
Percent of outsiders on 
board 0.2959727 0.096639 2.96 0.003 
CEO is also COB 0.0206269 0.042794 0.46 0.645 
Percent of shares traded 
previous year -0.032107 0.0439003 -0.73 0.463 
Year 2001 0.0142906 0.0126557 1.07 0.287 
Year 2002 0.042692 0.0152882 2.55 0.011 
Year 2003 0.0373644 0.018693 1.77 0.076 
Year 2004 0.0588769 0.0185626 2.83 0.005 
Year 2005 0.0505665 0.0204087 2.27 0.023 
Industry 2 -0.9842318 0.0067229 -9.88 0 
Industry 3 -0.9994914 0.0006418 -10.66 0 
Industry 4 -0.9880959 0.0054302 -10.55 0 
Industry 5 -0.9966188 0.0021804 -10.15 0 
Industry 6 -0.9768544 0.0088355 -9.63 0 
Industry 7 -0.9724524 0.0099991 -8.68 0 
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Table 6: Estimates of D&O policy limit based on cross-listing status 
    Robust     
  Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t 
     
Cross-list status 0.0815569 0.1596069 0.51 0.611 
Firm size in assets 0.3724443 0.0695143 5.36 0 
Shareholding by insiders -0.007373 0.0028559 -2.58 0.011 
Percent of shares owned by 
financial institutions -0.0566571 0.1223257 -0.46 0.644 
Volatility (std. dev. of 
compounded daily returns) 0.0046918 0.0203113 0.23 0.818 
Std. dev. Of return on 
assets in previous 3 years 0.4190388 0.1560892 2.68 0.009 
Lagged return on assets -0.072399 0.2533767 -0.29 0.776 
Percent of compensation in 
options -0.0897553 0.0463706 -1.94 0.056 
Growth in assets (if 
increased more than 25% in 
a year) -0.1723225 0.0781101 -2.21 0.03 
Likelihood of financial 
distress 0.0032777 0.0024881 1.32 0.191 
Number of board members 0.022098 0.0310784 0.71 0.479 
Percent of outsiders on 
board 0.1200078 0.3768241 0.32 0.751 
CEO is also COB -0.2093519 0.1258906 -1.66 0.1 
Percent of shares traded 
previous year -0.0981707 0.1705433 -0.58 0.566 
Year 2001 0.0285749 0.065822 0.43 0.665 
Year 2002 0.0110879 0.0665139 0.17 0.868 
Year 2003 0.0784966 0.0744498 1.05 0.294 
Year 2004 0.1960254 0.0769133 2.55 0.012 
Year 2005 0.1983658 0.092942 2.13 0.035 
Industry 2 -0.2879129 0.247387 -1.16 0.247 
Industry 3 -0.021039 0.185651 -0.11 0.91 
Industry 4 -0.0761114 0.2207887 -0.34 0.731 
Industry 5 0.2971036 0.3197329 0.93 0.355 
Industry 6 -0.0108682 0.2128623 -0.05 0.959 
Industry 7 0.1518345 0.3991291 0.38 0.704 
Constant 14.51952 0.4907241 29.59 0 
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Table 7: Estimates of D&O policy limit based on cross-listing status controlling for 
interaction between cross-listing status and years after SOX 
    Robust     
  Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t 
     
Cross-list status 0.0562323 0.1729817 0.33 0.746 
Interaction of cross-list 
status and post-SOX 
years 0.0496296 0.1007626 0.49 0.623 
Firm size in assets 0.3732793 0.0698134 5.35 0 
Shareholding by insiders -0.0073847 0.0028587 -2.58 0.011 
Percent of shares owned 
by financial institutions -0.0567891 0.1224572 -0.46 0.644 
Volatility (std. dev. of 
compounded daily 
returns) 0.0049456 0.0204173 0.24 0.809 
Std. dev. Of return on 
assets in previous 3 years 0.4196777 0.1564346 2.68 0.009 
Lagged return on assets -0.080332 0.2519938 -0.32 0.751 
Percent of compensation 
in options -0.0906324 0.0473003 -1.92 0.058 
Growth in assets (if 
increased more than 25% 
in a year) -0.1701033 0.0781277 -2.18 0.032 
Likelihood of financial 
distress 0.003257 0.0024854 1.31 0.193 
Number of board 
members 0.021916 0.0311415 0.7 0.483 
Percent of outsiders on 
board 0.1214775 0.3772933 0.32 0.748 
CEO is also COB -0.2077411 0.1258128 -1.65 0.102 
Percent of shares traded 
previous year -0.1020614 0.1718772 -0.59 0.554 
Year 2001 0.0292052 0.0660738 0.44 0.659 
Year 2002 0.0109899 0.0665645 0.17 0.869 
Year 2003 0.0663785 0.0798009 0.83 0.408 
Year 2004 0.1831885 0.0821125 2.23 0.028 
Year 2005 0.1856234 0.0992744 1.87 0.065 
Industry 2 -0.2883703 0.247562 -1.16 0.247 
Industry 3 -0.0219449 0.1856336 -0.12 0.906 
Industry 4 -0.0744055 0.2215357 -0.34 0.738 
Industry 5 0.2953112 0.3198324 0.92 0.358 
Industry 6 -0.0126325 0.2130626 -0.06 0.953 
Industry 7 0.1507401 0.3996845 0.38 0.707 
Constant 14.5221 0.4908497 29.59 0 
 
  31 
REFERENCES 
Baker, Tom, and Sean Griffith. 2007. “The missing monitor in corporate governance: The 
directors' & officers' liability insurer.” Georgetown Law Journal 95: 487-544.  
Ben-Ishai, Stephanie. 2008. “Sarbanes-Oxley Five Years Later: A Canadian Perspective.” 
 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 39: 469-491. 
Boyer, M. Martin. 2007. “Directors' and officers' insurance in Canada.” Corporate 
 Ownership & Control 4, (4): 141-5.  
Boyer, M. Martin. 2005. “Directors’ and officers’ insurance and shareholder protection.”  
Boyer, M. Martin, and Sharon Tennyson. 2008. “Directors' and officers' liability 
 insurance, corporate risk and risk taking: New panel data evidence on the role of 
 directors' and officers' liability insurance.” 
Carney, William J. 2005. “The costs of being public after Sarbanes-Oxley: The irony of 
'going private'.” Emory Law and Economics Research Paper ed.  
Chalmers, John M. R., Larry Y. Dann, and Jarrad Harford. 2002. “Managerial 
opportunism? Evidence from directors’ and officers’ insurance purchases.” Journal 
of Finance 57, (2) (04): 609-36.  
Clark, Robert Charles. 2005. “Corporate governance changes in the wake of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A morality tale for policymakers too.”  
Cohen, Daniel A., Aiyesha Dey, and Thomas Z. Lys. 2007. “The Sarbanes Oxley act of 
2002: Implications for compensation contracts and managerial risk-taking.” NYU 
working paper.  
Core, John E. 2000. “The directors' and officers' insurance premium: An outside 
assessment of the quality of corporate governance.” Journal of Law, Economics & 
Organization 16 (2).  
Core, John E. 1997. “On the corporate demand for directors' and officers' insurance.” 
Journal of Risk & Insurance 64 (1) (03): 63-87.  
Cotter Jr., William. 2003. The changing state of D&O insurance. Corporate Governance 
Advisor 11, (1): 8-16. 
Harris, Craig. 2003. The D&O shakeout. Canadian Underwriter 70, (3) (03): 24-30. 
Holderness, Clifford G. 1990. “Liability insurers as corporate monitors.” International 
Review of Law and Economics, 10 (2) (9): 115-29.  
  32 
Li, Haidan, Morton Pincus, and Sonja Olhoft Rego. 2008. “Market reaction to events 
surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and earnings management.” The 
Journal of Law and Economics 51 (1) (02/01): 111-34.  
Linck, James S., Jeffry M. Netter, and Tina Yang. 2008. “Effects and unintended 
consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley act on corporate boards.” AFA 2006 Boston 
Meetings Paper ed.  
Litvak, Kate. 2007. “The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley act on non-US companies cross-
listed in the US.” Journal of Corporate Finance, 13 (2-3) (6): 195-228.  
McDonnell, Brett. 2004. “Sarbanes-Oxley, fiduciary duties, and the conduct of officers 
and directors.” Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper ed.  
O'Sullivan, Noel. 1997. “Insuring the agents: The role of directors' and officers' insurance 
in corporate governance.” Journal of Risk & Insurance 64 (3) (09): 545-56.  
Taub, Stephen. “D&O Premiums Fell 10 Percent in 2004.” 9 Dec. 2004. 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3470704/c_3471624?f=TodayInFinance_Inside 
(accessed Mar. 1, 2009). 
 
